Geopolitical Watchlist & Sources

Geopolitical Watchlist

Live policy items tracked across this database, not tied to a single company.

• ASML EUV export ban to China

  In force — full ban on EUV scanner exports to China, enforced by the Netherlands government aligned with US policy

  Who's Affected

  SMIC and all Chinese advanced-node ambitions

  Why It Matters

  The core structural chokepoint capping Chinese foundries at roughly 7nm-equivalent density via DUV multi-patterning workarounds, regardless of capital investment

• High-NA EUV rollout (2026-2028)

  Intel took delivery of the first commercial unit (ASML TWINSCAN EXE:5200B) in Dec 2025; Samsung received its first unit in late 2025 and a second in 1H2026; mass production using these tools expected 2027-28 per ASML's CEO

  Who's Affected

  Intel, Samsung, SK Hynix confirmed as first adopters; TSMC has signaled it may wait until 2026-27 to integrate High-NA into A16

  Why It Matters

  The next lithography generation is, so far, distributed only to US-aligned players — extending rather than closing the gap with China

• 2025 EDA export-control episode (Synopsys/Cadence/Siemens)

  BIS directed the three major EDA vendors to halt China sales in 2025, then partially reversed the directive

  Who's Affected

  Chinese fabless design houses and SMIC's advanced-node ambitions

  Why It Matters

  Confirmed that design software, not just fab tools, is now an active lever in US-China tech competition — a second potential chokepoint beyond lithography

• CHIPS Act leading-edge fab funding status

  As of May 2026, all three major CHIPS-funded logic fabs are in volume production: TSMC Arizona Fab 21 Phase 1 (4nm, 24,000 wpm), Intel Ohio Module 1 (18A, 30,000 wpm), Samsung Taylor Fab 1 (3nm GAA, 15,000 wpm)

  Who's Affected

  TSMC, Intel, Samsung US operations

  Why It Matters

  US advanced-logic manufacturing share has risen from ~12% (2020) to ~22% (2026) per SIA estimates, though US-based wafer costs run 20-30% above equivalent Taiwan production

• TSMC Nanjing VEU revocation

  Confirmed: Washington revoked VEU status for TSMC's Nanjing (16/12nm) fab effective Dec 31, 2025

  Who's Affected

  TSMC's Nanjing fab and its customers; equipment/software suppliers now need individual export licenses per shipment

  Why It Matters

  Adds a live continuity question for any 16/12nm-class demand routed through TSMC's China site — this node sits at the edge of the 'leading-edge' scope covered here

• SMIC SMNC acquisition

  In process — SMIC acquiring Semiconductor Manufacturing North China (Beijing), adding two 300mm lines

  Who's Affected

  SMIC's domestic capacity base

  Why It Matters

  Domestic consolidation to grow capacity within existing export-controlled tool constraints, rather than through new leading-edge tool access

• Rapidus as a deliberate Japan-US-Europe diversification project

  Ongoing — IBM technology transfer, imec Core Partner Program membership, NYCREATES/Albany collaboration, Japanese government backing exceeding ¥900B cited across funding rounds

  Who's Affected

  Rapidus; broader US/Japan/EU strategic-autonomy goals

  Why It Matters

  Explicitly designed to diversify leading-edge capability away from Taiwan/Korea concentration — a geopolitical hedge that remains commercially unproven

US Import Tariffs by Fab Country

Rates apply to imports into the United States from each country hosting a fab in this database. 0 of 12 countries have a rate recorded — the remainder are shown as not recorded rather than estimated.

Sources